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Key Messages

Introduction

•

The green energy transition will be mineral
intensive. Manufacturing wind turbines, solar
panels, geothermal heat pumps, and batteries is
set to significantly increase demand for so-called
“critical” minerals.

The green energy transition will be exceedingly mineral
intensive.1 Scaling up the manufacturing of wind turbines,
solar panels, geothermal heat pumps, and batteries
to power cleaner technologies is set to generate an
exponential increase in the demand2 for so-called “critical”
minerals and metals.3

•

Forecasts of increased demand for critical
minerals—including as a result of post-COVID-19
stimulus plans—prompt high expectations in
mineral-rich countries and suggest promising
opportunities for developing countries.

Expectations for global economic recovery from the
COVID-19 pandemic may also be boosting hopes of
increased mineral demand, in particular as the promotion
of green energy4 might be part of post-pandemic stimulus
plans5 for certain countries.

•

However, projects to increase the primary
extraction of critical minerals rest on bullish
forecasts and uncertain terrain, because of factors
including ever-adapting technology leading to
increased mineral performance; substitutions
due to high mineral prices or supply scares;
reduced primary extraction due to increased
recycling, reuse, and the circular economy; and
greater reliance on agromining and biomining.

•

Investments in the primary extraction of critical
minerals could become obsolete and
economically stranded. Over-investing in
production may outstrip demand and lead to
minimal benefits for many countries.

•

Governments, international actors, and mining
advocates seeking to optimize the value of
green energy mineral reserves should heed
caution when pursuing and promoting the
mining of critical minerals. We provide specific
recommendations starting on page 7.
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While seeking to optimize the value of green energy
mineral reserves, governments—as well as international
actors and mining advocates—should heed caution when
pursuing and promoting the mining of critical minerals.
These projected development opportunities rest on
bullish forecasts and uncertain terrain. Caution is therefore
necessary to avoid creating expectations that in many
cases will not be met, or over-investing in production that
may outstrip demand and lead to minimal benefits for
many countries.
1 Arrobas, Daniele La Porta, et al. “The Growing Role of Minerals
and Metals for a Low Carbon Future” The World Bank. June 30, 2017.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/207371500386458722/
The-Growing-Role-of-Minerals-and-Metals-for-a-Low-Carbon-Future
2 “Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action”. World Bank. http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-ActionThe-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf;
“A Green Transition or an Expansion of Extraction?”. World Rainforest
Movement. https://wrm.org.uy/articles-from-the-wrm-bulletin/
viewpoint/a-green-transition-or-an-expansion-of-extraction
3 Henceforth, “minerals and metals” will be together referred to as “minerals.”
4 Calma, Justine. “Clean Energy Could Get Americans
Back to Work Post-Pandemic”. The Verge. April 30,
2020. https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/30/21243011/
clean-energy-renewables-coronavirus-recession-stimulus-unemployment
5 Green Stimulus Proposal. “A Green Stimulus to Rebuild
Our Economy”. Medium. May 5, 2020. https://medium.com/@
green_stimulus_now/a-green-stimulus-to-rebuild-our-economy-1e7030a1d9ee
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in response to the predicted 85% increase12 in the
lithium battery industry in the next 20 years, and
expected US$ 1.8 billion in lithium investments by
2022.13 Chile’s innovation programme, Corporación
Alta Ley, designed a 2035 Technology Roadmap
with the objective to reach US$ 4 billion in annual
mining exports.14 Additionally, the country’s mining
ministry and development agency has set up a
US$ 193 million15 “Technological Institute for solar
energy, low emission mining and advanced materials
of lithium and other minerals.”16 The mining ministry
is working to further build out its local lithium value
chain17 by setting out provisions to incentivise
downstream industries18 and clarifying existing
policies19 to push public and private investment
to double Chile’s lithium carbonate production to
230,000 metric tons per year by 2023.20

The need for a sense of caution is evidenced by two
World Bank reports on climate-smart mining. The first
report, published on May 11, 2020, highlights not only the
expected growth but also the volatility in expectations.6
In this report, the World Bank estimates that the clean
energy transition could lead the production of minerals
such as cobalt, graphite, and lithium to increase by up to
500% by 2050.
But the publication differs from an earlier 2017 World Bank
report7 that, using a similar methodology, had presented
even higher estimates, projecting a 965% increase in the
global demand of lithium by 2050, and a six-fold increase
in cobalt during the same period. The primary explanation
for this difference is how the World Bank factored recycling
and reuse into the estimated numbers in 2020, which
it had not done in 2017; and signals the importance of
understanding how estimates for use of materials might
not translate into extracting new materials. This distinction
is part of what we explore below.

Anticipated demand for minerals is fueling
great expectations in resource-rich countries
The forecasts for growth in green energy minerals suggest
promising opportunities for developing countries8 and
prompt high expectations in mineral-rich countries––some
of which have already begun taking action. For example:
•

The Democratic Republic of Congo, the world’s
number one producer of cobalt, nearly tripled the
royalty rate9 to be paid by cobalt miners in 2018
from 3.5% to 10% after declaring the mineral a
“strategic” substance.

•

Western Australia, in March 2020, changed the
lithium royalty regime to encourage beneficiation
into lithium hydroxide and lithium carbonate.10

•

In Chile––home to roughly 11% of the world’s lithium
resources11 and the number one exporter of copper––
major investment and policy action has been taken

6 Kirsten Hund et al., “The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy
Transition”. The World Bank, May 11, 2020. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/
en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-ofthe-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf
7 Arrobas, Daniele La Porta, et al. “The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a
Low Carbon Future”. The World Bank. June 30, 2017.
8 Ayuk, E. T. et al. “Mineral Resource Governance in the 21st Century: Gearing
extractive industries towards sustainable development ” The International
Resource Panel United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya. 2020.
9 “Congo Declares Cobalt ‘Strategic’, Nearly Tripling Royalty
Rate”. Reuters. December 3, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-congo-cobalt-idUSKBN1O220D
10 Other-Gee, Alex. “New Lithium Royalty Regime Commences
in Western Australia - Technical Update - MinterEllison”.
MinterEllison. April 6, 2020. http://www.minterellison.com/articles/
new-lithium-royalty-regime-commences-in-western-australia
11 “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020”. U.S. Department of the Interior & U.S.
Geological Survey. January 31, 2020. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/
mcs2020.pdf
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•

Bolivia has long dreamed of exploiting its sizable
lithium deposits, currently estimated to account for
more than one-quarter of the world’s resources21 of
the metal. In 2008, the government declared the
development of lithium—as well as other resources
found in the Uyuni salt flat—a national priority.22
The national plan for lithium development has
since been led by Bolivian state-owned company
Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB). To develop
national technology and avoid dependency on
foreign investment, the Bolivian government
earmarked investments of around US$ 1 billion.23
In 2018, YLB formed a joint venture with German
company ACI Systems, which planned to invest

12 “Chile to Boost Lithium Carbonate Production.” Chinatungstein.com. January
2, 2020. http://news.chinatungsten.com/en/tungsten-news/126940-tpn-8788
13 “Comisión Chilena Del Cobre (COCHILCO)”. BNamericas.com. https://www.
bnamericas.com/en/company-profile/comision-chilena-del-cobre-cochilco
14 “Roadmap 2.0 of Chilean Mining Update and Consensus for a Fresh Look”.
Alta Ley. 2019. https://corporacionaltaley.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/AltaLey_
Roadmap2019_Ingles_V01_opt.pdf
15 “Alta Ley | ASDIT Designed a New Executive Board of Directors for its
Application to the Institute of Clean Technologies”. November 20, 2019. https://
corporacionaltaley.cl/en/asdit-designed-a-new-executive-board-of-directors-forits-application-to-the-institute-of-clean-technologies
16 “Technological institute for solar energy, low emission mining and advanced
materials of lithium and other minerals”. CORFO. 2019. https://www.oecd.org/
dev/Corfo-Session_7_Chilean-Clean_Technologies_Institute.pdf
17 “Technological institute for solar energy, low emission mining and advanced
materials of lithium and other minerals”. CORFO. 2019.
18 Cambero, Fabian. “Chile Launches Tender for Value-Added Lithium
Projects”. Reuters. March 25, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-chile-lithium-sqm-idUSKCN1R621L
19 “Chile to Clean up Rules for Lithium Industry to Boost
Production”. Reuters, June 11, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-lithium-electric-chile-idUSKCN1TC1ZA
20 Jamasmie, Cecilia. “Chilean Legislators Reject Lithium Expropriation”.
MINING.COM. September 3, 2019. https://www.mining.com/
chilean-legislators-reject-lithium-expropriation
21 “Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020”. U.S. Department of the Interior & U.S.
Geological Survey. January 31, 2020. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/
mcs2020.pdf.
22 Plurinational State of Bolivia. Supreme Decree No. 29496 (2008). http://www.
mineria.gob.bo/juridica/20080401-9-53-43.pdf
23 Mariette, Maëlle. “In Bolivia, the Lithium Sector up for Auction”.
Le Monde Diplomatique. January 2020. https://mondiplo.com/
en-bolivia-el-sector-del-litio-a-subasta.
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US$ 1.3 billion; the deal was canceled in November
2019.24 YLB also entered into an agreement with a
Chinese consortium to implement a US$ 2.3 billion
lithium project.25 In the aftermath of President Evo
Morales’s resignation in late 2019 and the ensuing
political instability, the fate of these investments is
uncertain26—but Bolivia’s lithium dream lives on,
based on hopes of increased demand. Juan Carlos
Zuleta, YLB’s chief until January 2020, intended
to increase annual production of lithium from
the current 400 metric tons to 50,000 metric tons
in five years.27

Great expectations are paired with
great uncertainty
With some countries already restructuring their legal
frameworks and building infrastructure to optimize
their projected profits, it is wise to evaluate the volatile
foundation on which these forecasts rest, as to best
prepare for the multitude of possible futures that
lie ahead.
Building hopes on the anticipated boom in demand for
the so-called critical minerals poses risks because nobody
knows with certainty what the future of technology has
in store—particularly affecting the uncertain demand for
“minor metals with few and specific, mostly high-tech,
applications.”28 Today’s technology—and its associated
mining requirements—can become yesterday’s news29
at a speed that far outpaces the adaptability of mines,
threatening to leave these resource-intensive investments
obsolete and economically stranded.

Increasing material performance
First, continuously improving material performance has
always been a main objective of material engineering.
For example, while the lithium-ion battery is today’s
commercialized battery model of choice, it has its
shortcomings,30 such as its high price point, fast aging,
and need for protection circuitry. A substantial amount of
R&D investment has been directed to accelerate battery
technology towards cheaper, lighter, more energy dense
and eco-friendly batteries.
Scientists at the California Institute of Technology and
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory have developed
fluoride-ion chemistry, making it possible for engineers at
the Honda Research Institute31 to develop a new battery
that could replace traditional lithium-ion devices.32 Due
to the light atomic weight of the element, fluoride-ion
batteries (FIBs) are 10 times more energy dense than
lithium ones, and could potentially power electric vehicles,
airplanes, and cordless power tools.
And IBM Research has recently reported33 development
on a new battery to power electric vehicles that is free of
heavy metals such as cobalt and nickel and outperforms
existing lithium-ion batteries given its lower cost, faster
charging ability, higher energy and power density, higher
energy efficiency, and lower flammability of electrolytes.
Tesla, too, is developing new batteries that will rely on
low cobalt or cobalt free innovations that will decrease
internal stress and improve the ability to store energy
for longer periods in both electric vehicles and home or
commercial use.34

Technology development could take several pathways
leading to reduced demand for some commodities.

24 Carrie Hampel. “Decree Annulled on Bolivian-German Lithium Deal”.
Electrive.com. November 4, 2020. https://www.electrive.com/2019/11/04/
decree-annulled-on-bolivian-german-lithium-deal/;
Mining.com. “Germany Looks To Renew Scrapped Bolivian Lithium Deal”.
OilPrice.com. https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Germany-Looks-ToRenew-Scrapped-Bolivian-Lithium-Deal.html
25 Ramos, Daniel. “Bolivia Picks Chinese Partner for $2.3 Billion Lithium
Projects”. Reuters. February 6, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-bolivia-lithium-china-idUSKCN1PV2F7
26 Vella, Heidi. “Bolivia: Will the Ousting of Morales Open Lithium to
Foreign Investment?”. Mining Technology | Mining News and Views
Updated Daily. March 2, 2020. https://www.mining-technology.com/features/
bolivia-will-the-ousting-of-morales-open-lithium-to-foreign-investment/
27 Jourdan, Adam. “Exclusive: Bolivia’s New Lithium Tsar Says Country Should
Go It Alone”. Reuters. January 15, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-bolivia-lithium-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZE2DW
28 Renner, S., Wellmer, F. W.. “Volatility drivers on the metal market and exposure
of producing countries”. Mineral Economics. August 19, 2019. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s13563-019-00200-8
29 Tauber, Matthias, Jan Philipp Bender, and Matthias Tauber. “The New
Technology Frontier in Mining”. Boston Consulting Group. January 31, 2018.
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/new-technology-frontier-mining.aspx

30 “Li-Ion Battery Advantages / Disadvantages”. electronicnotes.
https://www.electronics-notes.com/articles/electronic_components/batterytechnology/li-ion-lithium-ion-advantages-disadvantages.php
31 Davis, Victoria K. et al. “Room-Temperature Cycling of Metal Fluoride
Electrodes: Liquid Electrolytes for High-Energy Fluoride Ion Cells - RoomTemperature Cycling of Metal Fluoride Electrodes: Liquid Electrolytes for HighEnergy Fluoride Ion Cells - HRI-US”. Science. December, 2018.
32 “New Battery Breakthrough Could Replace Lithium-Ion”.
ASSEMBLY. January 23, 2019. https://www.assemblymag.com/
articles/94724-new-battery-breakthrough-could-replace-lithium-ion
33 Na, Young-hye. “Free of Heavy Metals, New Battery Design Could Alleviate
Environmental Concerns”. IBM Research Blog. December 18, 2019. https://www.
ibm.com/blogs/research/2019/12/heavy-metal-free-battery/
34 Lienert, Paul, Norihiko Shirouzu. “Tesla’s Secret Batteries Aim to Rework the
Math for Electric Cars and the Grid”. Reuters. May 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-autos-tesla-batteries-exclusive-idUSKBN22Q1WC
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Similarly, a lot of R&D is going into defining the photovoltaic
cell technology that will optimize the solar-to-electrical
energy conversion factors;35 and the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (U.S. Department of Energy) has
counted four categories36 of competing photovoltaic cell
technologies currently being developed worldwide, each
with different material implications.

Substituting due to high mineral prices
A second pathway to mineral selection is good old
fashion economics: When minerals become economically
problematic, the industry adapts and minerals that were
once deemed “critical” are replaced. The evolving role
of cobalt within the energy sector over the past 80 years
is a good example. In the 1940s, cobalt was thrust into
significance when the aluminum-nickel-cobalt (AlNiCo)
magnet replaced electromagnets;37 and further secured
its value in 1970 with the development of the even more
energy dense samarium-cobalt magnet.38 However,
due to the sudden increase in price of cobalt in the
1980s,39 these magnets were superseded by neodymium
iron boron magnets40 which remain the dominant
magnet today.41

Substituting due to supply scares
Third, in addition to high prices, inaccessibility of materials
due to political leveraging (for example, the imposition of
quotas, licenses, taxes,42 and export bans) and political
conflicts can prompt investment in innovations that
replace certain minerals with others.
This phenomenon was witnessed with respect to rare
earth elements (REEs).43 These elements have physical
and chemical properties that make them highly useful
in various current technologies, including batteries,
35 Ayuk, E. T. et al. “Mineral Resource Governance in the 21st Century: Gearing
extractive industries towards sustainable development”. The International
Resource Panel United Nations Environment Programme. 2019.
36 “Best Research-Cell Efficiency Chart”. National Renewable Energy Laboratory.
https://www.nrel.gov/pv/cell-efficiency.html
37 Bell, Terence. “Cobalt Metal Characteristics, Production, Applications
and More”. ThoughtCo.. August 13, 2019. https://www.thoughtco.com/
metal-profile-cobalt-2340131
38 Bell, Terence. “Cobalt Metal Characteristics, Production, Applications and
More”. ThoughtCo.. August 13, 2019.
39 “Cobalt Price 2020 [Updated Daily]”. Metalary. http://www.metalary.com/
cobalt-price/
40 “Resourcing Green Technologies through Smart Mineral Enterprise
Development: A Case Analysis of Cobalt”. Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/10/Resourcing-GreenTechnologies-through-SMED2.pdf
41 “The Role of Cobalt in NdFeB Permanent Magnets”. Arnold Magnetic
Technology. 2015. https://www.arnoldmagnetics.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/TN_1502_rev_151214.pdf
42 Van Gosen, B.S. et al. “Rare-Earth Elements”. U.S. Geological Survey. 2017.
https://doi.org/10.3133/pp1802O
43 According to the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, there
are 17 REEs: cerium (Ce), dysprosium (Dy), erbium (Er), europium (Eu), gadolinium
(Gd), holmium (Ho), lanthanum (La), lutetium (Lu), neodymium (Nd), praseodymium
(Pr), promethium (Pm), samarium (Sm), terbium (Tb), thulium (Tm), and ytterbium
(Yb) (the 15 lanthanides), plus scandium (Sc) and yttrium (Y).
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magnets, lasers, and computers and other electronics.
However,
technological
innovations
leading
to
substitutions of minerals have allowed their criticality to be
significantly reduced.
Following China’s temporary ban on REE exports to
Japan44 in 2010, the Japanese automobile industry turned
to R&D geared toward mineral substitution. In response to
the supply halt, Toyota greatly reduced45 their use of REEs
terbium and dysprosium in their 2016 Prius, while Honda
Motor Co eliminated the need entirely by co-developing
the first hybrid car free of heavy REEs.46 Looking forward,
Toyota promises to eliminate47 terbium and dysprosium
from future magnets, with plans to replace 50% of the
expensive REE neodymium with the cheaper REEs
lanthanum and cerium.
And the auto industry was not the only one to adapt their
behaviors48 following the 2010 supply scare. Oil refineries
temporarily abandoned lanthanum in their refining phase,
and glassmakers forwent cerium in their polishing process
while prices remained high.

Reduce primary mineral extraction through
recycling, reuse, and the circular economy
A fourth area of uncertainty is the extent to which new
mining will be replaced by reuse and recycling of materials.
Rapidly evolving technology trends—motivated in part by
circular economy policies, particularly in Europe—push
for a progressive reduction in the need for the primary
extraction of minerals. Regarding some minerals, these
trends may eventually allow avoiding primary extraction
altogether, with significant impacts on the traditional
mining sector generally and, in particular, the hopes of
mineral-rich developing countries.
Estimates of global recycling rates signal promising
prospects for recycling some minerals that tend to be
increasingly needed for the low-carbon energy transition.
For example, a study by UN Environment Programme49
estimated end-of-life recycling rates—which measure the
proportion of mineral products produced from scrap and
other residues—at 70–90% for iron and steel, 43–53% for
44 Bradsher, Keith. “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan”. The
New York Times, September 22, 2010. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/
business/global/23rare.html
45 Hsu, Jeremy. “Don’t Panic about Rare Earth Elements”. Scientific American.
May 31, 2019.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dont-panic-about-rare-earth-elements/
46 Shiraki, Maki, Tajitsu, Naomi. “Honda Co-Develops First Hybrid Car Motor
Free of Heavy Rare Earth Metals.” Reuters, July 12, 2016. https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-honda-rareearths-idUSKCN0ZS06C
47 Bomgardner, Melody. “New Toyota Magnet Cuts Rare-Earth Use”. Chemical
and Engineering News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-toyota-magnet/
new-toyota-magnet-cuts-dependence-on-key-rare-earth-metal-for-ev-motorsidUSKCN1G413F
48 Hsu, Jeremy. “Don’t Panic about Rare Earth Elements”. Scientific American.
49 UNEP. “Recycling Rates of Metals – A Status Report”. Resourcepanel.org.
2020. https://www.resourcepanel.org/reports/recycling-rates-metals
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copper, and 42–70% for aluminium. Steel already is the
most recycled material50 globally, and recycling copper
and aluminium is highly cost-effective, as they can be
repeatedly recycled without performance loss and using
85% less energy than primary production.51
Prospects are admittedly not so promising for all minerals.
Iron, copper, and aluminium are in the select group of 18
metals52 for which estimated end-of-life recycling rates
are above 50%. For many others, recycling rates are very
low. For REEs, for example, recycling rates are at about
1%.53 As shown above, innovations allowing substitution
of REEs have reduced their criticality to some extent.
Even so, the inability to satisfy through recycling the still
increasing demand for REEs and other minerals with low
recycling rates, while manufacturers are still unable to do
completely without them through substitution, pushes for
greater primary extraction54 of these minerals.
At the same time, acknowledging the criticality of those
minerals, their untapped recycling potential,55 and the
potential social and environmental benefits56 and the
avoided climate impacts57 of recycling over primary
extraction has encouraged developed countries to
increase investment in R&D to improve recycling rates,
as recommended by an OECD study.58 The European
Union59 has spent EUR 39 million on R&D for REE recycling
in the last decade; policy advocates have called for similar
action in the United States.60

50 Steel Recycling Institute. “Steel Is the World’s Most Recycled Material”.
https://www.steelsustainability.org/recycling
51 Schröder, Patrick. “Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular
Economy”. April 1st, 2020. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/
files/2020-04-01-inclusive-circular-economy-schroder.pdf
52 “Mineral Production to Soar as Demand for Clean
Energy Increases”. World Bank. May 11, 2020. https://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/05/11/
mineral-production-to-soar-as-demand-for-clean-energy-increases
53 Jowitt, Simon M. et al. “Recycling of the Rare Earth Elements”. Current
Opinion in Green and Sustainable Chemistry. October 1, 2018.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S2452223617301256?via%3Dihub
54 Schröder, Patrick. “Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular
Economy”. April 1, 2020.
55 The extent to which the potential is still untapped is unclear given the lack
of up-to-date data on global recycling rates for a wide range of minerals. Most
frequently cited global recycling rates—including in the World Bank’s 2020 report
and this paper—stem from a UN Environment Programme study of 2011 (footnote
47 above). It may well be that recycling rates have improved since.
56 Parletta, Natalie. “Rare Earth Minerals Could Be Sourced Through Old
Batteries, Smartphones, Wind Turbines”. Forbes. November 21, 2019. https://
www.forbes.com/sites/natalieparletta/2019/11/21/rare-earth-minerals-could-besourced-through-outdated-smart-phones-batteries-wind-turbines/
57 “The Circular Economy - a Powerful Force for Climate Mitigation”.
Material Economics. https://materialeconomics.com/publications/
the-circular-economy-a-powerful-force-for-climate-mitigation-1
58 Coulomb, R., et al, “Critical Minerals Today and in 2030: An Analysis for OECD
Countries”. OECD. September 28, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrtknwm5hr5-en
59 Cole, Laura. “Europe Takes on China’s Global Dominance of Rare Earth
Metals”. www.euractiv.com, July 2, 2019. https://www.euractiv.com/section/
batteries/news/europe-takes-on-chinas-global-dominance-of-rare-earth-metals/
60 Ayala, Christine. “R&D, Not Greenland, Can Solve Our Rare Earth
Problem”. The Hill. September 18, 2019. https://thehill.com/opinion/
energy-environment/462038-rd-not-greenland-can-solve-our-rare-earth-problem

In the same vein, the EU has also made its new Circular
Economy Action Plan61 one the core components of
the European Green Deal, focusing on various mineralintensive sectors, including electronics; information and
communication technology (ICT); batteries; vehicles; and
construction and buildings. In its action plan, the EU sets a
best-efforts goal to double the use rate of circular material
by 2030. This is precisely within the timeframe that
many new mines will come into production, potentially
impacting demand and price expectations. Reaching this
ambitious target would significantly affect the demand for
primarily extracted materials from the developing world.
With global electronic waste (e-waste) projected to reach
120 million metric tons per year by 2050,62 and less than
20% of it being formally recycled, the annual value of
global e-waste is over US$ 62.5 billion.63 For some scarce
metals, such as gold, larger quantities are prevalent
in e-waste than in the earth itself (100 times more gold
is found in one tonne of e-waste than in one tonne of
gold ore).
Given this unsustainable paradigm, members of the
Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy (PACE)
and the United Nations (UN) E-Waste Coalition (including
members of UN Environment, the World Economic
Forum, the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development, and the Global Environment Facility) have
called for a global reboot64 of the electronics system; one
that prioritizes recycling, reuse, urban mining, durable
product design, and renting or leasing models over
ownership of technology.
The growing momentum of recycling technologies can
also be perceived in the update of the climate-smart
mining report. While the 2017 World Bank report65
estimating the demand for minerals needed for the lowcarbon transition explicitly ignored recycling rates,66 the
2020 report67 includes “additional analysis...on if and
61 “New Circular Economy Strategy - Environment - European Commission.”
European Union. March 25, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/environment/
circular-economy/
62 “A New Circular Vision for Electronics Time for a Global Reboot”. Platform for
Accelerating the Circular Economy. January 2019. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_A_New_Circular_Vision_for_Electronics.pdf
63 “UN Report: Time to Seize Opportunity, Tackle Challenge of
e-Waste”. UNEP - UN Environment Programme. January 24, 2019.
http://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/press-release/
un-report-time-seize-opportunity-tackle-challenge-e-waste
64 “A New Circular Vision for Electronics Time for a Global Reboot”. Platform for
Accelerating the Circular Economy. January 2019. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_A_New_Circular_Vision_for_Electronics.pdf
65 Arrobas, Daniele La Porta, et al. “The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for
a Low Carbon Future.” The World Bank. June 30, 2017.
66 “This analysis calculates energy technologies’ total demand for metals, but
does not include a factor for what portion of that demand could be met by
recycled metal.” Arrobas, Daniele La Porta, et al. “The Growing Role of Minerals
and Metals for a Low Carbon Future”. The World Bank. June 30, 2017.
67 Kirsten Hund et al., “The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy
Transition”. The World Bank, May 11, 2020. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/
en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-ofthe-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf
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how mineral recycling and reuse could potentially affect
estimated mineral demand,” focusing on five minerals
only (aluminum, cobalt, copper, nickel, and lithium).
Although concluding that strong demand for primary
extraction would persist even if their recycling rates
increased significantly, the 2020 report notes that “current
recycling rates could reduce the required primary demand
for minerals involved in the low-carbon transition” and
that “future increases in recycling rates can play an
important role in mitigating increases in demand for
primary minerals.”68
We can reasonably assume that R&D and technology
developments resulting from stronger pushes for recycling,
reuse, and the circular economy, will improve recycling
rates and dampen the demand for primary extraction. For
instance, Tesla is working on the recycling and recovery
of nickel, cobalt and lithium to save on costs as well as on
“second life” applications of electric vehicle batteries in
grid storage systems.69
Finally, the circular economy also offers potential
development opportunities70 for developing countries.
For instance, the Nigerian government, along with
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and United
Nations (UN) Environment Programme, kicked off a
US$ 15 million investment in a formal e-waste recycling
industry71 in Nigeria. Excessive focus on expected
mineral demand and investment can divert the attention
of resource-rich countries’ attention away from these
development opportunities.

Exploring increased reliance on agromining
and biomining
Fifth, research conducted since the 1990s has uncovered
hundreds of hyperaccumulators—plant species that
absorb and concentrate minerals at high levels. Their
cultivation to extract minerals is called phytomining or
agromining.72 Hyperaccumulating plants can be used
as cleaners, to remove minerals from mine tailings and
polluted soils for remediation purposes, or as miners, to
literally farm for valuable elements in mineral-rich soils.

68 Kirsten Hund et al., “The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition”. The
World Bank, May 11, 2020.
69 Lienert, Paul, Norihiko Shirouzu. “Tesla’s Secret Batteries Aim to Rework the
Math for Electric Cars and the Grid”. Reuters. May 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-autos-tesla-batteries-exclusive-idUSKBN22Q1WC
70 Wellesley, Laura. “How the Circular Economy Could Help Developing
Countries Grow Sustainably”. Ethical Corporation. http://www.ethicalcorp.com/
how-circular-economy-could-help-developing-countries-grow-sustainably
71 "UN Report: Time to Seize Opportunity, Tackle Challenge of e-Waste”. UNEP UN Environment Programme. January 24, 2019.
72 Ent, Antony Van der, et al. “Agromining: Farming for Metals: Extracting
Unconventional Resources Using Plants”. Springer International Publishing, 2018.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319618982
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Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and New Caledonia73 show
great potential for the agromining of nickel, which has so
far been the most successfully phytomined mineral, with
relatively low production costs and high profitability.74
The potential of agromining extends to various other
elements,75 including cadmium, cobalt, gold, platinum
group elements, REEs, and zinc.76
While phytomining or agromining uses plants for mineral
extraction, biomining (done in the two steps: bioleaching
and biooxidation)77 uses bacteria and other microorganisms
to extract certain minerals from their ores—even from
waste deposits in tailings.78 Cobalt, gold, nickel, silver,
uranium, zinc, and notably copper79 are among minerals
that can be extracted80 through biomining. Capital costs
of biomining are about 50%81 of those of conventional
smelting and refining operations, and its competitiveness
tends to increase as energy costs decrease.
For reasons of scale, agromining and biomining are
unlikely to obviate the need for traditional mining. Even so,
as these technologies are further developed and become
more economical, they will tend to play increasingly
important roles in complementing the supply of critical
minerals with lower impacts on the local environment and
on the global climate, creating more uncertainty on mining
demand trends in resource-rich developing countries.

Adopting a herd mentality poses
significant risks
The mining industry has always been a cyclical one,
and investment patterns have generally followed the
cycle. When demand is growing and prices increase,
investments in the top minerals rise. At a certain point,
73 Morse, Ian. “Down on the Farm that Harvests Metal from Plants”. The New
York Times. February 26, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/science/
metal-plants-farm.html
74 Clifford, Martin et. al. “Extracting Innovations: Mining, Energy,
and Technological Change in the Digital Age”. CRC Press. May 8,
2018. https://www.routledge.com/Extracting-Innovations-MiningEnergy-and-Technological-Change-in-the/Clifford-Perrons-Ali-Grice/p/
book/9781138040823
75 Ent, Antony Van der, et al. “Agromining: Farming for Metals: Extracting
Unconventional Resources Using Plants”. Springer International Publishing, 2018.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319618982
76 Adams, Reuben. “Petal to the Metal: How ‘Phytomining’ Could Transform Mine
Waste into Big $$”. Stockhead. July 17, 2019. https://stockhead.com.au/resources/
petal-to-the-metal-how-phytomining-could-transform-mine-waste-into-big/
77 Mahajan, Surabhi, et al. “Bioleaching and Biomining”. In Principles and
Applications of Environmental Biotechnology for a Sustainable Future. October
15, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1866-4_13
78 Falagán, Carmen et al. “New Approaches for Extracting and Recovering
Metals from Mine Tailings”. Minerals Engineering, Biohydrometallurgy. May 15,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mineng.2016.10.008
79 Dresher, William. “Innovations in Copper: Mining & Extraction: Producing
Copper Nature’s Way: Bioleaching”. May 2014. https://www.copper.org/
publications/newsletters/innovations/2004/05/producing_copper_natures_way_
bioleaching.html
80 “Bioleaching Definition & Process”. AngloAmerican. https://www.
angloamerican.com/futuresmart/our-industry/mining-explained/
mining-terms-explained-a-to-z/bioleaching-definition-and-process
81 Dresher, William. “Innovations in Copper: Mining & Extraction: Producing
Copper Nature’s Way: Bioleaching”. May 2014.
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almost inevitably, too much capacity to produce comes
online, and this reverses the supply and demand equation,
causing prices to drop again until demand rises back up.
This pattern is not unique to mining; we have seen it in
other commodities, including, most recently, in the oil and
gas sector.
Too many countries and companies adopting a “herd”
mentality and rushing to produce the minerals needed
for today’s energy technology constitutes serious risks
of over-supply.

Risks of overproduction
A flooded market due to promotion by world development
agencies and banks could incite a market value crash. The
classic example of this was seen in the coffee sector82 when
Vietnam, boosted by government assistance,83 ramped
up their production 1100% in the 1990s,84 wreaking havoc
on the price of coffee globally in the process.
Closer to home for our purposes, from 2016 to early
2018, cobalt experienced an unprecedented price surge85
as a result of optimistic forecasts for the EV sector which
spurred a “cobalt rush.” By March 2018, the supply surplus
brought about a precipitous collapse86 with cobalt losing
around 70% of its value.

Resource curse and “presource” curse risks
Even though a discovery of resources or a boom in
resource-related industries should lead to increased
output and economic growth, it is a well-recognized fact
that countries rich in non-renewable resources tend to
experience slower economic growth, more social issues,
and worse development outcomes than less endowed
countries—a paradox known as the resource curse.87
In addition to the threat of the resource curse, overly zealous
expectations can drive suboptimal behaviors, resulting in
resource-rich countries experiencing slower economic
growth before any minerals are even extracted. This
phenomenon of economic underperformance following
82 Sachs, Jeffrey. “Ensuring Economic Viability and Sustainability of Coffee
Production”. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. October 2019. http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2020/02/Ensuring-Economic-Viability-and-Sustainability-ofCoffee-Production.pdf
83 ”Country Coffee Profile: Vietnam”. International Coffee Organization. March
25–29, 2019.
http://www.ico.org/documents/cy2018-19/icc-124-9e-profile-vietnam.pdf
84 Craves, Julie. “The Coffee Crisis — Coffee & Conservation”. Coffee and
Conservation. February 8, 2006. https://www.coffeehabitat.com/2006/02/
the_coffee_cris/
85 “Congo Declares Cobalt ‘Strategic’, Nearly Tripling Royalty Rate”. Reuters.
December 3, 2018.
86 “Why Have Cobalt Prices Crashed”. International Banker. July 31, 2019. https://
internationalbanker.com/brokerage/why-have-cobalt-prices-crashed/
87 “The Resource Curse - The Political and Economic Challenges of Natural
Resource Wealth”. National Resource Governance Institute. April 27, 2015. https://
resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/primer-resource-curse

over-optimism among governments and international
institutions is known as the presourse curse.88 In this case,
it is the promise of resource abundance, rather than the
abundance itself, that leads to an economic downturn.89
And just as it has been observed in new oil producer
countries, so too does it threaten to curtail the economic
development of emerging mineral-rich countries.
Elevated expectations can drive harmful behaviors.90 For
example, the projections may first influence the media and
civil society to put pressure on their government to engage
in imprudent and risky overspending or overborrowing.91
Second, lenders and rating agencies may be swayed as
well, resulting in artificially low borrowing costs, leading to
further overborrowing.92 And third, given the complexity,
inherent geological risk, and high upfront cost of mining
projects, some of these projects might not come to fruition,
leaving countries without the profits they anticipated. The
presource curse suggests an over-reliance by governments
on one path to an economic future, instead of planning
increasingly diversified economic growth.
Because of these factors, countries can see their public
spending programs compromised and debt sustainability
worsen, leaving them engaged in public development
programs and debt programs that they are no longer able
to finance.

A word of caution for resource-rich
countries: How to hedge against the risks of
inflated expectations?
Reliance on the expectations for green energy materials
should not replace careful planning, assessment of
specific opportunities, and allocation of mining risks, to
ensure against over-production. While the World Bank
and other organizations are rightly promoting “climatesmart” mining93 to help resource-rich countries maximize
their returns, governments should address the risks that
not all green energy related mining will, in itself, be “smart
mining,” as demonstrated above.

88 Mihalyi, David, Cust, Jim. “What Is the Presource Curse?”. Natural Resource
Governance Institute. November 28, 2017. https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/
what-presource-curse
89 Mihalyi, David, Cust, Jim. “The Presource Curse - Finance & Development,
December 2017”. International Monetary Fund. December 2017. https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2017/12/cust.htm
90 Mihalyi, David, Cust, Jim. “The Presource Curse - Finance & Development,
December 2017”. International Monetary Fund. December 2017.
91 Mihalyi, David, Cust, Jim. “What Is the Presource Curse?”. Natural Resource
Governance Institute. November 28, 2017.
92 Mihalyi, David, Cust, Jim. “The Presource Curse - Finance & Development,
December 2017”. International Monetary Fund. December 2017.
93 “Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action”. World Bank. http://
pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-ActionThe-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf
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Governments (and the private sector) can take a number
of steps to maximize the value of climate-smart mining
and minimize its risks. Among these steps are:

1. Recognizing that not all minerals will be
the same: there is a need to analyze each
proposed project separately
Whether a potential project related to green energy
commodities is first developed by the government or
first proposed by the private sector, it is important to
carefully analyze the project. Some key factors to take
into account are set out below. For here, the key point is
that each potential project has to be analyzed in detail,
without assuming that globalized forecasts for green
energy technology will guarantee positive results from the
project. Globalized forecasts have to be individualized to
each project to be validated in order to make an informed
decision on its likely success, commercial viability,
and net value to the government in terms of revenues
versus costs.

2. Considering several factors in evaluating
each project
a. Understanding global levels of investment in any
given commodity: The value of any given project will
be a function of future supply and demand when the
mine production begins. This could be several years
from when a mine plan is being developed. So it is
very important to understand the global investment
market for a commodity. Contrary to herd thinking,
if everybody is doing it, that may be a very good
reason not to do the same thing. Over-investment
in a commodity can, as discussed above, kill the
market price for all producers and make the cost
of production the critical factor in a mine’s success
or failure. Understanding different market scenarios
against the proposed cost of production is critical.
b. Understanding competing pathways of industry for
that commodity and risks of technology change
associated with it: Is the proposed mine dependent
on one technology for its success so that markets for
it are limited, or are there multiple markets and uses
for a product on the market? The more diversified
the utility of the commodity, the better the chance
for a product to find a market if one use becomes
outdated for whatever reason.
c.

Building scenario and sensitivity analysis capacity:
It is important for governments to understand how
to build and model different scenarios for future
demand and prices, and what this means for the
economics of a proposed mine. This effort takes
both commodity specific expertise and modelling
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expertise, which may not always be available inhouse. Even so, these are critical inputs in assessing
the viability of a proposed mine.

3. Understanding economic spillover effects
from new technology in mining
a. When assessing the potential value of a proposed
mine, it is important to carefully assess the related
economic spillovers: local employment,94 local
inputs of goods and services,95 shared-use of
infrastructure,96 social development benefits97 of a
project, etc. These factors are part of the equation
for making an informed decision, but it is difficult
to assess whether they may make an otherwise
marginal business proposition worth proceeding
with. Most importantly, however, when these factors
are being considered it must be in the context of
the technology and design being put forward by the
project proponent. Many new mining technologies98
are coming on line now that provide few opportunities
for large-scale employment or local purchasing.99 So
these issues must be tied to actual planning and not
theoretical assumptions of economic spillovers.
b. Does the mining project provide an anchor for
economic diversification? Can some or all of the
mine’s proposed production be used in-country
or within the neighboring countries to promote
more local and regional development? Can the
mines collaborate with local technology institutes
in transferring skills100 for the other sectors of the
economy or to enable job creation even in the
context of automation? These types of economic
spillovers can be critical to diversify economies.

94 “Employment from Mining and Investments in Land for Agriculture”.
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/
projects/employment-from-mining-and-investments-in-land-for-agriculture
95 “Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable
Development (IGF)”. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://
www.iisd.org/library/igf-guidance-governments-local-content-policies
96 “Leveraging Mining-Related Infrastructure Investments for
Development (Rails, Port, Power, Water and ICT)”. Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
leveraging-infrastructure-investments-for-development
97 “Community Development Requirements: Laws, Best Practices, and
Community Development Agreements Database”. Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
community-development-agreements-frameworks-and-tools
98 “Mining a Mirage: Reassessing the Shared-Value Paradigm in Light of the
Technological Advances in the Mining Sector”. Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2016/09/01/mining-a-mirage-reassessingthe-shared-value-paradigm-in-light-of-the-technological-advances-in-the-miningsector
99 “The Mine of the Future”. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.
September 2016. http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/the-mine-of-the-future
100 “South Africa: Horizontal linkages— Building expertise by overcoming
country-specific constraints (Case Study)”. Intergovernmental Forum on
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). IGF Guidance for
Governments: Leveraging Local Content Decisions for Sustainable Development.
Winnipeg: IISD. 2018. https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/casestudy-south-africa-horizontal-linkages.pdf
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4. Understanding the potential fiscal benefits
(revenues) from a proposed mine
a. There are a number of inter-related issues: What
are the expected tax and royalty revenues from a
proposed mine? Is the private sector partner heavily
invested in aggressive tax planning and treatyshopping enabling transfer pricing, profit shifting,
and minimization of withholding taxes on dividends?
Is the beneficial owner known and directly implicated
in the project development? Does the government
have a good fiscal model for the proposed project,
without relying only on the project proponent?
b. Governments must carefully consider the need
for any tax or other incentives.101 These incentives
can end up costing the government more than
it receives over the lifetime of a project. This is
especially important when it comes to tax holidays,
which can leave a government with far less revenue
than anticipated as companies adjust the rates of
production to maximize the value of such holidays.102

5. Thinking outside the box
New challenges present opportunities for rethinking old
approaches to mining. COVID-19 might have provided
momentum for it as the global halt in mining production103
has brought to light the importance of securing a
steady mineral supply chain.104 For example, are there
relationships that can be built with corporate consumers
directly to stabilize future markets for production up front,
through, for instance, long-term contracts and strategic
partnerships? Can governments remain the owners of
the mine, or jointly own a mine with the end-user of the
product instead of the mining company? These might be
beneficial when the commodity is focused on one or two
types of end-users who also have a need for secure supply
lines. Finally, can new minerals be found in urban e-waste
or existing tailings instead of through primary extraction,
thereby developing the basis of a circular economy?
The options above are some of the ones available to
governments and the private sector to improve the
opportunities for success of a proposed mine. Some
or all of these may be relevant to assess a potential
future project.
Our key point remains clear regardless of these variables:
globalized forecasts for climate-smart mining do not
guarantee the success of any individual proposed project.
There is not a pot of gold waiting to be picked up at
the end of every mining rainbow. Governments should
take the responsibility to assess each project on its
own merits and plan accordingly. Cautious and specific
assessment and planning are the best guarantees of a
successful project.
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